Our
Wars Are Killing Us: Pentagon Time Tick…Tick…Tick…
Writers Articles And Opinions
30 January 2010
By Tom Engelhardt
[Note for TomDispatch readers: In my younger days,
I used to dream of running a book review section in
some magazine or newspaper. I was always struck that
such sections only responded to the one question that
deeply interested publishers: What’s new? They never
reviewed on the basis of questions a reader might ask.
I imagined a review section that, in its choices,
might respond to some of those questions and so deal
in older as well as newly published books. With that
in mind, let me recommend a book published four years
ago. The other night in the wee hours, in a fit of
insomnia, I finished the 2006 novel of the young
Nigerian novelist Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, Half of a
Yellow Sun. It's a remarkable re-imagining of the grim
Nigerian civil war of the 1960s -- a tragic tale, but
no less engrossing for that. The characters are a
wonder. The next morning, I woke up to find an essay
of hers on the great Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe
(Things Fall Apart) at Salon.com, in which she
conjures up a 1950s world in which a reasonable
publishing question in England (or the U.S.) was
“Would anyone possibly buy a novel by an African?” and
her own first encounter with Achebe in the 1980s. (“I
did not know in a concrete way until then that people
like me could exist in literature.”)
If, in the wee hours, you, too, want to be swept into
another world filled with surprises, which is the
magic of the best of novels, think about picking up a
copy of Yellow Sun. And while you’re at it, consider
this a small reminder that, if you are purchasing
anything, book or otherwise, at Amazon and go to it
via any book link at TomDispatch (or one of the linked
covers in any TD piece), we get a small percentage of
your purchase. It’s the simplest way to contribute to
TD without expending an extra cent. Tom]
Back in 2007, when General David Petraeus was the
surge commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, he had a
penchant for clock imagery. In an interview in April
of that year, he typically said: “I'm conscious of a
couple of things. One is that the Washington clock is
moving more rapidly than the Baghdad clock, so we're
obviously trying to speed up the Baghdad clock a bit
and to produce some progress on the ground that can
perhaps give hope to those in the coalition countries,
in Washington, and perhaps put a little more time on
the Washington clock.” And he wasn’t alone. Military
spokespeople and others in the Bush administration
right up to the president regularly seemed to hear
one, two, or sometimes as many as three clocks ticking
away ominously and out of sync.
Hearing some discordant ticking myself of late, I
decided to retrieve Petraeus’s image from the dustbin
of history. So imagine three ticking clocks, all right
here in the U.S., one set to Washington time, a second
to American time, and the third to Pentagon time.
In Washington -- with even the New York Times now
agreeing that a “majority” of 100 is 60 (not 51) and
that the Senate’s 41st vote settles everything -- the
clock seems to be ticking erratically, if at all. On
the other hand, that American clock, if we’re to
believe the good citizens of Massachusetts, is ticking
away like a bomb. Americans are impatient, angry, and
“in revolt” against Washington time. That’s what the
media continue to tell us in the wake of last week’s
Senate upset.
Depending on which account you read, they were
outraged by a nearly trillion dollar health-care
reform that was also a giveaway to insurance
companies, and annoyed by Democratic candidate Martha
Coakley calling Curt Schilling a “Yankees fan” as well
as besmirching handshaking in the cold outside Fenway
Park; they were anxious about an official
Massachusetts unemployment rate of 9.4% (and a higher
real one), an economy that has rebounded for bankers
but not for regular people, soaring deficits,
staggering foreclosure rates, mega-banking bonuses,
the Obama administration’s bailout of those same
bankers, and its coziness with Wall Street. They were
angry and impatient about a lot of things, blind angry
you might say, since they were ready to vote back into
office the party not in office, even if behind that
party’s “new face” were ideas that would take us back
to the origins of the present disaster.
A Blank Check for the Pentagon
It’s worth noting, however, that they’re not angry
about everything -- and that the Washington clock,
barely moving on a wide range of issues, is still
ticking away when it comes to one institution. The
good citizens of Massachusetts may be against free
rides and bailouts for many types, but not for
everybody. I’m speaking, of course, about the
Pentagon, for which Congress has just passed a record
new budget of $708 billion (with an Afghan
war-fighting supplemental request of $33 billion,
essentially a bail-out payment, still pending but sure
to pass). This happened without real debate, much
public notice, or even a touch of anger in Washington
or Massachusetts. And keep in mind that the Pentagon’s
real budget is undoubtedly close to a trillion
dollars, without even including the full panoply of
our national security state.
The tea-party crews don’t rail against Pentagon
giveaways, nor do Massachusetts voters grumble about
them. Unfettered Pentagon budgets pass in the
tick-tock of a Washington clock and no one seems fazed
when the Wall Street Journal reveals that military
aides accompanying globe-hopping parties of
congressional representatives regularly spend
thousands of taxpayer dollars on snacks, drinks, and
other “amenities” for them, even while, like some K
Street lobbying outfit, promoting their newest
weaponry. Think of it, in financial terms, as Pentagon
peanuts shelled out for actual peanuts, and no one
gives a damn.
It’s hardly considered news -- and certainly nothing
to get angry about -- when the Secretary of Defense
meets privately with the nation’s top
military-industrial contractors, calls for an even
“closer partnership,” and pledges to further their
mutual interests by working “with the White House to
secure steady growth in the Pentagon's budgets over
time.” Nor does it cause a stir among the denizens of
inside-the-Beltway Washington or the citizens of
Massachusetts when the top ten defense contractors
spend more than $27 million lobbying the federal
government, as in the last quarter of 2009 (a
significant increase over the previous quarter), just
as plans for the president’s Afghan War surge were
being prepared.
Nor is it just the angry citizens of Massachusetts, or
those tea-party organizers, or Republicans stalwarts
who hear no clock ticking when it comes to “national
security” expenditures, who see no link between our
military-industrial outlays, our perpetual wars, and
our economic woes. When, for instance, was the last
time you saw a bona fide liberal economist/columnist
like Paul Krugman include the Pentagon and our wars in
the litany of things potentially bringing this country
down?
Yes, striking percentages of Americans attend the
church (temple, mosque) of their choice, but when it
comes to American politics and the economy, the U.S.
military is our church, “national security” our Bible,
and nothing done in the name of either can be wrong.
Talk about a blank check. It’s as if the military,
already the most revered institution in the country,
existed on the other side of a Star-Trekkian financial
wormhole.
Pentagon Time Horizons
Which brings us to Pentagon time. Yes, that third
clock is ticking, but at a very different tempo from
those in Washington or Massachusetts.
Americans are evidently increasingly impatient for
“change” of whatever sort, whether you can believe in
it or not. The Pentagon, on the other hand, is
patient. It’s opted for making counterinsurgency the
central strategy of its war in Central and South Asia,
the sort of strategy that, even if successful, experts
claim could easily take a decade or two to pull off.
But no problem -- not when the Pentagon’s clock is
ticking on something like eternal time.
And here’s the thing: because the media are no less
likely to give the Pentagon a blank check than the
citizens of Massachusetts, it’s hard indeed to grasp
the extent to which that institution, and the military
services it represents, are planning and living by
their own clock. Though major papers have Pentagon
“beats,” they generally tell us remarkably little,
except inadvertently and in passing, about Pentagon
time.
So, for the next few minutes, just keep that Pentagon
clock ticking away in your head. In the meantime,
we’ll go looking for some hints about the Pentagon’s
war-fighting time horizons buried in news reports on,
and Pentagon contracts for, the Afghan War.
Take, as a start, a January 6th story from the inside
pages of my hometown paper. New York Times reporter
Eric Schmitt began it this way: “The military’s effort
to build a seasoned corps of expert officers for the
Afghan war, one of the highest priorities of top
commanders, is off to a slow start, with too few
volunteers and a high-level warning to the armed
services to steer better candidates into the program,
according to some senior officers and participants.”
At stake was an initiative “championed” by Afghan War
commander General Stanley McChrystal to create a
“912-member corps of mostly officers and enlisted
service members who will work on Afghanistan and
Pakistan issues for up to five years.”
The news was that the program, in its infancy, was
already faltering because it didn’t conform to one of
the normal career paths followed in the U.S. military.
But what caught my eye was that phrase “up to five
years.” Imagine what it means for the war commander,
backed by key figures in the Pentagon, to plan to put
more than 900 soldiers, including top officers, on a
career path that would leave them totally wedded, for
five years, to war in the Af-Pak theater of
operations. (After all, if that war were to end, the
State Department might well take charge.) In other
words, McChrystal was creating a potentially powerful
interest group within the military whose careers would
be wedded to an ongoing war with a time-line that
extended into 2015 -- and who would have something to
lose if it ended too quickly. What does it matter then
that President Obama was proclaiming his desire to
begin drawing down the war in July 2011?
Or consider the plan being proposed, according to Ann
Scott Tyson, in a January 17th Washington Post piece,
by Special Forces Major Jim Gant, and now getting a
most respectful hearing inside the military. Gant
wants to establish small Special Forces teams that
would “go native,” move into Afghan villages and
partner up with local tribal leaders -- “one tribe at
a time,” as an influential paper he wrote on the
subject was entitled. “The U.S. military,” reported
Tyson, “would have to grant the teams the leeway to
grow beards and wear local garb, and enough autonomy
in the chain of command to make rapid decisions. Most
important, to build relationships, the military would
have to commit one or two teams to working with the
same tribe for three to five years, Gant said.” She
added that Gant has “won praise at the highest levels
[of the U.S. military] for his effort to radically
deepen the U.S. military's involvement with Afghan
tribes --- and is being sent back to Afghanistan to do
just that.” Again, another “up to five year”
commitment in Afghanistan and a career path to go with
it on a clock that, in Gant’s case, has yet to start
ticking.
Or just to run through a few more examples:
* In August 2009, the superb Walter Pincus of the
Washington Post quoted Air Force Brigadier General
Walter Givhan, in charge of training the Afghan
National Army Air Corps, this way: "Our goal is by
2016 to have an [Afghan] air corps that will be
capable of doing those operations and the things that
it needs to do to meet the security requirements of
this country." Of course, that six-year timeline
includes the American advisors training that air
force. (And note that Givhan’s 2016 date may actually
represent slippage. In January 2008, when Air Force
Brig. Gen. Jay H. Lindell, who was then commander of
the Combined Air Power Transition Force, discussed the
subject, he spoke of an “eight-year campaign plan”
through 2015 to build up the Afghan Air Corps.)
* In a January 13th piece on Pentagon budgeting plans,
Anne Gearan and Anne Flaherty of the Associated Press
reported: “The Pentagon projects that war funding
would drop sharply in 2012, to $50 billion” from the
present at least $159 billion (mainly thanks to a
projected massive draw-down of forces in Iraq), “and
remain there through 2015.” Whether the financial
numbers are accurate or not, the date is striking:
again a five-year window.
* Or take the “train and equip” program aimed at
bulking up the Afghan military and police, which will
be massively staffed with U.S. military advisors (and
private security contractors) and is expected to cost
at least $65 billion. It’s officially slated to run
from 2010-2014 by which time the combined Afghan
security forces are projected to reach 400,000.
* Or consider a couple of the long-term contracts
already being handed out for Afghan war work like the
$158 million the Air Force has awarded to Evergreen
Helicopters, Inc., for “indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity (IDIQ) contract for rotary wing aircraft,
personnel, equipment, tools, material, maintenance and
supervision necessary to perform passenger and cargo
air transportation services. Work will be performed in
Afghanistan and is expected to start Apr. 3, 2009, to
be completed by Nov. 30, 2013.” Or the Pentagon
contract awarded to the private contractor SOS
International primarily for translators, which has an
estimated completion date of September 2014.
Ending the Pentagon’s Free Ride
Of course, this just scratches the surface of
long-term Afghan War planning in the Pentagon and the
military, which rolls right along, seemingly barely
related to whatever war debates may be taking place in
Washington. Few in or out of that city find these
timelines strange, and indeed they are just
symptomatic of an organization already planning for
“the next war” and the ones after that, not to speak
of the next generation bomber of 2018, the integrated
U.S. Army battlefield surveillance system of 2025, and
the drones of 2047.
This, in short, is Pentagon time and it’s we who fund
that clock which ticks toward eternity. If the
Pentagon gets in trouble, war-fighting or otherwise,
we bail it out without serious debate or any of the
anger we saw in the Massachusetts election. No one
marches in the streets, or demands that Pentagon
bailouts end, or votes ‘em (or at least their
supporters) out of office.
In this way, no institution is more deeply embedded in
American life or less accountable for its acts;
Pentagon time exists enswathed in an almost religious
glow of praise and veneration -- what might once have
been known as “idolatry.” Until the Pentagon is forced
into our financial universe, the angry, impatient one
where most Americans now live, we’re in trouble. Until
candidates begin losing because angry Americans reject
our perpetual wars, and the perpetual war-planning
that goes with them, this sort of thinking will simply
continue, no matter who the “commander-in-chief” is or
what he thinks he’s commanding.
It’s time for Americans to stop saluting and end the
Pentagon’s free ride before America’s wars kill us.
Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire
Project, runs the Nation Institute's TomDispatch.com.
He is the author of The End of Victory Culture, a
history of the Cold War and beyond, as well as of a
novel, The Last Days of Publishing. He also edited The
World According to TomDispatch: America in the New Age
of Empire (Verso, 2008), an alternative history of the
mad Bush years.