Family Politics And the New Gaza
Crisis: Blindfolding, Stripping Down
Palestinian Men
Posted By Ramzy Baroud
August 15, 2008
Yet more haunting images of blindfolded,
stripped down Palestinian men being
contemptuously dragged by soldiers in uniform
from one place to another. Yet more footage of
bloodied men lying on hospital beds describing
their ordeals to television reporters who have
heard this story all too often. Yet more news
of Palestinian infighting, tit-for-tat
arrests, obscene language and embarrassing
behaviour from those who have elected
themselves -- or were elected -- to represent
the Palestinian people.
Once again, the important story that ought to
matter the most -- that of a continually
imposing and violent Israeli occupation -- is
lost in favour of Palestinian-infused
distractions, deliberate or not.
In Gaza, the story of the Israeli siege, which
represents one of today's most catastrophic
man-made disasters, is relegated in favour of
renewed infighting between Hamas and Fatah,
whether directly or by proxy. As always, the
Gaza story is largely told with biased and
presumptive undertones: to indict one party as
terrorist and extremist and to hail another as
a champion of liberty and a defender of
democracy. Such nonsensical conclusions cannot
be further from the truth as in the latest
clashes between Palestinian police under the
command of the deposed Hamas government and
militants from the Helis family, concentrated
mostly in Gaza City.
The Hamas-Helis clash of early August was
immediately probed by news media and
Palestinian officials themselves as an
extension of ongoing Hamas-Fatah violence,
which led in the summer of 2007 to a complete
Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip. The logic
was simple: the Helis clan is largely loyal to
Fatah, thus Hamas's violent storming of their
neighbourhood 2 August was an attack on rival
Fatah. Hamas, on the other hand, explained its
crackdown on Helis militants as part of its
hunt for those responsible for the murder of
five of its members and a civilian in a
massive blast that rocked Gaza beach 25 July.
Naturally, Hamas pointed the finger at
militants affiliated with Fatah in Gaza --
even though it refrained from directly
accusing its rival Fatah -- and at Israeli
intelligence collaborators amongst
Palestinians. Fatah denied any responsibility
in the bombing, which was clearly orchestrated
to destabilise the Gaza Strip. Gaza, despite
the debilitating siege, has been enjoying
relative security as a result of Hamas's firm
control and a moderately successful truce,
agreed on by both Israel and Hamas, with the
consent of all Palestinian factions.
The truce with Israel, accompanied by hesitant
but constant calls made internationally to
"engage" Hamas, positive remarks about
dialogue made by PA President Mahmoud Abbas,
and recent efforts in Jordan to bring the
ostracised movement back to mainstream Arab
politics, have all helped lay the groundwork
for an inescapable conclusion: that Hamas is
not a fleeting phenomena, and that isolation
and repression have proved an ingredient of
strength to the Islamic movement in Gaza and
elsewhere.
Just then, the Gaza blast went off. The nature
of the beach bombing is a clear indication
that it was not a random act of revenge. The
high-profiled targets, the intensity of the
blast, its precision and its timing all
suggest an elaborate operation aimed at a
conclusive political consequence. Some Arabic
news reports, including Aljazeera.net, stated
that the bombing was a suicide attack. If
true, then the employment of such a tactic --
which had thus far targeted Israeli occupation
soldiers, paramilitary settlers and civilians
-- would reflect the state of urgency and
desperation of the attackers. In other words,
the bombing needed to achieve its political
aim even if it compels such an extreme upgrade
in tactics. And if the goal was to destabilise
Gaza, further discredit the Hamas government,
derail the possibility of reconciliation
between Hamas and Fatah, and invite security
chaos in the somewhat stable Strip, then the
bombing was a considerable success.
Indeed, Hamas's subsequent criminal
investigation led it to the Helis compound in
Gaza. Demanding that the agreement between
Hamas and Gaza's large clans be honoured,
Hamas demanded the handing over of several
Helis militants accused of perpetrating and
carrying out the beach attack. The details of
what followed remain blurry and narrated based
on political affiliations. Helis clan members
and Fatah officials say that Hamas attacked
the compound with rockets and indiscriminate
gunfire. Hamas contends that the militants
fired at its officers first, compelling a gun
battle that led to the death of 11 people,
including on both sides, and the wounding of
90 more. To capitalise on another handy
opportunity, Israel promised to deliver
Fatah-Helles clan members, who fled Gaza to
Israel, to the Palestinian Authority in
Ramallah, in the West Bank, as it later did.
According to one Israeli official, the move
was part of Israel's commitment to fight
Islamic extremism.
In reality, however, the beach bombing of 25
July was designed to provoke a violent Hamas
reaction, which was preceded and followed by
mass arrests of Hamas and Fatah members in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and has
ultimately aborted planned Egyptian mediation
between the two main Palestinian factions,
thus weakening an already fractured
Palestinian political front.
More, the fact that Abbas had met with
representatives of the Helis clan in the West
Bank, as if they represent a political
organisation, was a dangerous validation of
clan militancy that has grown in Palestine
after the Oslo Accords of 1993 due to the
security vacuum and decided corruption that
have afflicted the Palestinian police for
years. Clan militants became a necessary
phenomenon to protect each family's interests,
and had replaced the underground United
National Front, which managed Palestinian
affairs, despite of the Israeli occupation,
which has done its utmost to break down
Palestinian society and create an inherent
sense of insecurity.
The bombing of 25 July, the violence of 2
August, and the political repercussions they
have generated have proved immensely harmful
to Palestinian national interests and spoiled
the prospects of political reconciliation,
thus national unity, which in my opinion, was
the very intent of the violence in the first
place.
-Ramzy Baroud (www.ramzybaroud.net) is an
author and editor of PalestineChronicle.com.
His work has been published in many newspapers
and journals worldwide. His latest book is The
Second Palestinian Intifada: A Chronicle of a
People's Struggle (Pluto Press, London).
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